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Abstract 
 
This paper compares investments in innovation from the early days of the financial 
crisis up to mid 2009 using a survey covering more than 5,000 firms across twenty 
one European countries. Our interest is in how differences in labour market 
institutions and human capital affect a firm’s innovation investment during the 
recent financial crisis. We find that continuity of investment in innovation in Europe 
during the onset of the financial crisis in 2008-9 was strongest in countries which 
have both high earnings replacement rates and high participation in vocational 
education and training; countries with just one were more likely to see reduced 
innovation, while we find no effect (either positive or negative) from job security.  
 
Key words: varieties of capitalism; labour market institutions; skills; innovation investment; financial 
crisis; EU labour market; comparative studies. 
JEL codes: J24, J65,  O31, O57, P52. 
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1. Introduction 
Two persistent questions in the comparative study of capitalism are what role 
skilled labour plays in national systems of innovation, and how different forms of 
social insurance contribute to the development of skill.  
Skilled labour plays a role in innovation by contributing to a firm’s ability to 
adopt new technologies, to make incremental process improvements, and to 
operate production systems which are flexible in the sense of being able to both 
vary and to make incremental improvements to the product. Developing the skills 
which contribute to innovation may require risky investments by the employer, the 
worker, or both. Investment in a skill is risky for the employer if the worker might 
move to another job where the skills are useful; it is risky for the worker if the 
market for the skill is thin or volatile – conditions which will attach not only to skills 
which are specific to a firm, but also to skills which may be vulnerable to a sudden 
loss of market due, say, to technological obsolescence or off-shoring. Skills with this 
sort of vulnerability are often specific to a particular industry or technology, and as 
shorthand from this point on we will simply call them ‘specific skills’. 
Either job security (JS) or unemployment insurance (UI), together with some 
provision for re-training, can provide insurance to offset the risk associated with 
specific skills (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001, [EIS]). A long tradition in 
comparative research shows how JS, together with restrictions on worker mobility, 
have contributed to skill development and innovation in both Japanese (e.g. Dore 
1973; Aoki 1988) and German (e.g. Sorge and Streeck 1988) firms. In recent years, 
more interest has been addressed to the contribution of the UI mechanism to skills 
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and innovation, often as part of a package labelled ‘flexicurity’ (e.g. Lorenz 2011).  
(Flexicurity takes different forms in different times and places, and the use of the 
term itself is perhaps too flexible in policy documents (Viebrock and Clasen 2009); 
we mean something like the Danish mix of weak JS, strong short term UI, and 
retraining which can be provided independent of employment, through a strong 
vocational education and training (VET) system.) 
Innovation systems, like labour markets, can be understood as being shaped by 
national institutions (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). Hall and Soskice (2001) 
maintained that innovation in liberal market economies (LMEs) tends to be more 
radical while that in coordinated market economies (CMEs) is more typically 
incremental. All of the cases just mentioned – high JS Germany and Japan, 
flexicurity Denmark – would be classified, in the terms of Hall and Soskice, as CMEs. 
Though the empirical basis for this radical/incremental sorting of national 
innovation systems has been questioned (Akkermans, Castaldi, and Los 2009), it 
remains worthwhile to ask how national differences in the composition of skills 
affects innovation.  
The contribution of VET to skill formation, and through skill to innovation, is not 
always clear. VET has often been found to be ineffective at delivering useful skills 
(World Bank 1991); critics cite the separation between VET providers and 
employers (see the discussion in Crouch, Finegold, and Sako 1999) as weakening 
both the ability and the incentive to provide up-to-date skills under conditions of 
rapid technological change. In addition to the substantive shortcomings this may 
reflect, it presents a problem for comparative research: unobserved heterogeneity 
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in the quality of VET may mean that some VET systems produce skills which are 
valuable for innovation, while others do not – a difference which will not be evident 
in, say, the national VET participation rates published by the World Bank.  
The mechanism described by EIS can provide a way around the problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity in VET quality: if the skills required for innovation 
include specific skills, and if VET outcomes depend on the motivations of the 
students (workers), then the ability of VET to deliver the skills required for 
innovation will depend on social insurance (either JS or UI). By the same token, 
although social insurance may be necessary for the widespread investment in 
specific skills, it will not on its own be sufficient – institutions which provide VET will 
also be required. 
In this paper we address these questions in the context of Europe in the early 
months of the financial crisis (late 2008 and early 2009). In the empirical analysis 
we employ data at the micro (firm) and macro (country) level. For the former, we 
use the Innobarometer Survey 2009 carried out from the European Commission 
(2009). This survey is covered more than 5,000 firms across Europe. For the country 
level analysis, our data are from the OECD, Eurostat and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. We ask how national mixes of UI, VET, and JS affect 
decisions by firms to sustain, increase, or reduce investments in innovation after 
the onset of the crisis. Controlling for a number of firm-specific characteristics, 
including pre-crisis changes in innovation investment by the same firms, and for 
country-level changes in GDP, we get country-level indicators of innovation 
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investment during the crisis. We then compare these with relative national levels of 
UI, VET and JS.  
Our results are consistent with the complementarity of UI and VET: the countries 
that sustain innovation well are never weak in both, while almost all of those whose 
firms do not sustain innovation during the crisis are weak in either UI or VET (or, in 
the case of the UK, both). This is consistent with EIS, and with the flexicurity model. 
However, while in EIS JS and UI have similar effects, and in the flexicurity model 
strong JS is viewed as a problem, we find no relationship, positive or negative, 
between JS and sustained innovation – JS, in this case, is simply irrelevant. 
The paper is organized as follows. The Section 2 reviews briefly the theory and 
previous findings on the relationship JS, UI, skill formation, innovation, and financial 
crisis. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the empirical model and 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Social protection, investment in specific skills, innovation, and response to 
crisis 
We are interested in VET as a source of skills which are industry- or technology 
specific. These need to be distinguished from firm-specific skills and general skills, 
the categories employed in basic human capital theory. That theory predicts that 
employers will pay for firm-specific skills and workers for the general ones. We can 
define general skills in either of two ways: a negative definition is simply that the 
skill is not firm-specific; a positive one is that the skill is broadly transferable, useful 
in numerous industries and occupations. The negative definition is far broader – it 
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includes more skills – not only broadly transferable skills, but also skills which are 
useful only within a particular industry (those associated with underground mining 
or clothes manufacturing, for instance) or in the use of a particular technology (for 
instance, linotype operation, or the ability to customize Linux-based networks and 
applications). From an employer’s standpoint, these industry- or technology-
specific skills are fully transferable, and the employer will not pay for training unless 
employee mobility is restricted (through contract or through employer collusion), 
or there is some assurance that other employers will do comparable training. From 
the worker’s standpoint, however, investment in such narrow skills can entail a 
considerable risk. As discussed above, this problem can be remedied through some 
form of social insurance: if somebody (typically either an employer or the state) can 
and does make a credible promise of either continued employment or income 
replacement, together with retraining, in the event the skill loses value, then 
workers will be willing to spend their time acquiring industry- or technology-specific 
skills even if the markets for these skills are very thin or uncertain.  
In the absence of credible insurance, skills which are specific will command a risk 
premium, at best (at worst, faced by uncertainty and limited borrowing capacity, 
workers will simply opt for skills which are truly transferable, or for which demand 
appears likely to be stable: sales, teaching, accounting, law...), and employers will 
favour production systems and products which depend less on specific skills. The 
bias against specificity in the absence of adequate insurance can be seen as 
analogous to Williamson’s (1985) analysis of the way incomplete contracts produce 
a bias in favour of general purpose, as opposed to transaction specific, assets.  
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EIS observe that, among rich industrial countries, those with relatively high levels 
of either JP or UI (or both) have, on average, much higher rates or participation in 
VET than countries with low levels of both JP and UI; the countries with low levels 
of both forms of protection are the English-speaking countries, which are also what 
Hall and Soskice (2001) classify as LMEs. EIS use this observation to support the 
argument that income and training insurance – whether offered by the state 
through a combination of strong UI and VET, or the employer as a response to 
strong JP – encourage investment in specific skills. 
The package of policies and institutions known as ‘flexicurity’ is can be 
understood as one part of the territory that EIS associate with high VET. Flexicurity 
includes high UI, retraining for the unemployed (i.e., off-the-job VET available at 
any stage of a worker’s career), but relatively low JS (Kok 2003; Wilthagen and Tros 
2004; Council of Europe 2005; Crouch 2010). (The Commission of the European 
Communities (2007) specifies ‘moderate’ JS in its definition of flexicurity, but their 
starting point is the perceived problem of high JS.) Here, the relationship between 
UI and the willingness to invest in skills is consistent with the EIS analysis, although 
in most accounts of flexicurity the emphasis on specificity is missing; JS, on the 
other hand, is regarded as hindering the efficient allocation of labour, raising 
unemployment, fostering labour market dualism, and inhibiting productivity 
growth. Flexicurity is, roughly speaking, descriptive of the Nordic, Dutch, and Swiss 
economies; the German-style systems (including also Austria and Belgium), 
historically high in both UI and JS, can be seen as moving toward flexicurity as they 
have reduced JS over the past two decades.  
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While flexicurity provides an attractive policy package, both the positive and the 
negative planks of the flexicurity platform have uncertain empirical support. The 
overall macroeconomic benefits of flexicurity are contested (see also the discussion 
in Schwartz 2001; e.g., Becker 2005; Giugni 2009; Gold 2009), as is its functioning in 
times of crisis (Tangian 2010). And, while JS appears to have an adverse effect on 
employment levels, the effect is small compared with those caused by variations in 
monetary policy (Baccaro and Rei 2007); as with minimum wages (DiNardo, Fortin, 
and Lemieux 1996), the aggregate loss of labour income from downward flexibility 
may outweigh gains from employment; and incremental reforms (e.g., the 
reduction of JS for new hires or certain groups of workers) can produce an 
employment quality outcomes worse than either broad JS or employment at will 
(Blanchard and Landier 2002). In light of these problems, and in light of the 
acknowledged role JS has played in the growth of certain national economies in the 
post-World War II period, the curtailment of JS is not something to be pursued 
without careful examination. 
These functional roles of strong JS can be important even if it is so that flexicurity 
– the strong UI/high VET package – is a globally superior solution. Manca et al. 
(2010) find “substantial heterogeneity across EU Member States in terms of how 
close they are to fulfilling flexicurity ‘requirements’.” Flexicurity is not simply as a 
policy package that can be put in place by the passage of legislation: it depends on 
institutional functions which may not be present in states that are fiscally or 
administratively weak, or which have political systems that do not support inter-
generational bargains. EIS’s argument is that greater investment in specific skills 
occurs when there is a credible promise of both income support and retraining in 
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the event of job loss at some unknown future point in a young worker’s career. In 
other writings (e.g.Iversen 2005; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007; Estevez-Abe 
2008) the same authors argue that this credibility requires not only institutions 
which are seen to be delivering income support and retraining, but also a 
‘consensual’ constitutional setup that supports inter-generational bargains. 
Elimination of the laws sustaining strong JS, on the other hand, is a policy choice 
which in many countries could be effected by a single legislative act. In the absence 
of institutions which can sustain and credibly promise the strong UI/high VET 
package, a policy decision in favour of flexicurity could result simply in the 
elimination of JS, with the promised new form of social insurance and new 
incentive for specific training both stillborn.1 Given this difficulty it is worth knowing 
just how important is this ‘flexibility’ leg of ‘flexicurity’. 
We turn now to innovation. In general, we expect investment in innovation to 
decline during a financial crisis, due both to diminished financial resources and to 
increased uncertainty: R&D expenditure (one category of investment in innovation) 
is pro-cyclical in OECD economies (OECD 2009; WIPO 2010). Yet, the disruptive 
effects of crisis may bring opportunities, or simply a perceived imperative to adapt 
in order to survive. Deep and long recessions – such as those occasioned by major 
financial crises - are often accompanied by major shifts in technological paradigm 
and industry structure (Dosi 1982; Perez 2010); Field (2003) finds that the Great 
                                                 
1 . The difficultly of delivering an alternative to JS tells us something about why the defence of JS has 
been so stubborn: why in countries with strong JS and low UI, ‘reforms’ have protected insiders, not 
so much curtailing the strength of JS as increasing the proportion of new entrants to the workforce 
not legally entitled coverage by the JS umbrella, thus institutionalizing labour market dualism. This 
creates outcomes which – independent of movement on the UI/VET question – may be worse than 
either universal strong JS or no JS at all (Blanchard and Landier 2002; Bassanini et al. 2009). 
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Depression in the United States – the period 1929-1941 - was for that country also 
“the most technologically progressive decade of the [20th] century.”  
Studies of innovation have often emphasized the frontiers of technological 
advance and the development new processes and products – not least because 
data on patent filings and formal R&D expenditures is readily available, while 
measures of most other innovation activity are not. In recent decades, however, 
data on the innovative activity of firms, more broadly defined, has been gathered 
through a number of ongoing surveys. “Innovation” in this context includes the 
application and adaptation of technologies new to the firm using them, and non-
technological forms of innovation, in areas such as marketing, design, organization, 
business models (OECD 2005). This broad definition of innovation is consistent with 
the view, long evidenced in comparative studies, that the skills relevant to 
innovation are not only those of scientists and engineers at the top level,  but 
include what are often classed as “intermediate” skills. 
The relationship between innovation, skills, and employment systems can be 
seen as one of the central ways in which the innovative activity of firms is shaped, 
in both its level and character, by national institutions (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 
1992; Nelson 1993). Within the European union, states have maintained (Lorenz 
and Lundvall 2006), and even increased (Archibugi and Coco 2005) their 
heterogeneity in terms of innovation performance and technological development. 
Differences of innovation and technological capabilities make an important 
contribution to differences in growth rates (Fagerberg 1994; Castellacci 2008) and 
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are thus a factor in the convergence – or lack of it – between European economies 
(Tumpel-Gugerell and Mooslechner 2003; Kutan and Yigit 2007) 
JS and UI may have direct effects on firms’ innovation decisions. The skills of the 
workforce may also affect these decisions; the stock of skills is in turn affected by 
the JS and UI provisions previously in place, and in important respects the system of 
skill development and the systems of JS and UI may be mutually determined. At the 
risk of simplifying this web of causation, let us trace a few ways in which these 
labour market institutions may affect the innovation choices of firms during a 
financial crisis. 
In liberal economic doctrine, JS is almost certain to retard innovation by 
discouraging in a crisis re-allocation of labour and / or by removing incentives for 
innovative effort. Yet it is plausible that JS can encourage innovation, if the reduced 
threat of job loss encourages employees’ cooperation in productivity improvement, 
or if the lock-in motivates employers to innovate in order to find productive uses 
for otherwise surplus labour. Levinthal and March (1981), and Nohria and Gulati 
(1996), have argued that a certain amount of organizational slack – that is, human 
resources and organizational capabilities in excess of operating requirements - is 
necessary if firms are to innovate. JS is broadly associated with slack, and is certain 
to produce slack in a downturn. During a crisis, the effects (positive or negative) of 
JS should be especially strong: sharp changes in demand will require greater 
reallocation of labour and availability of labour in excess; the reduced financial 
capabilities of firms tighten constraints on their ability to re-allocate labour 
internally, but financial market conditions (elevated liquidity preference of private 
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investors; curtailed bank lending) also constrain the ability of the labour market to 
re-allocate labour between firms; the elevated threat of job loss may increase effort 
or, if job loss appears imminent, may shift workers attention elsewhere.  
UI could also affect innovation activity during a downturn, though expected the 
direction of the effect is not clear: by lowering the worker’s cost of job loss UI could 
reduce incentives for work effort (Gintis and Ishikawa 1987), and innovating 
presumably requires effort; on the other hand, income security should reduce 
employee resistance to productivity-enhancing innovation. 
From the employer’s standpoint, a more highly skilled workforce should be a 
more flexible instrument, enhancing the relative value of innovating during a crisis. 
Also, if innovation may be undertaken to make use of under-employed workers, 
then is should be positively associated with hoarding of skilled workers; whether 
such hoarding is more prevalent when skilled workers make up more of the work 
force (so that more are worth hoarding) or when they are scarcer, is not clear a 
priori.  
 
3. Data sources 
3.1 Firm-level data: the Innobarometer Survey 
Our firm level data is from the Innobarometer Survey 2009, designed and 
collected by the European Commission (2009). In each of the 27 EU Member states, 
plus Norway and Switzerland,2 200 enterprises from most manufacturing and 
                                                 
2 In the smallest EU countries, Cyprus, Malta, and Luxembourg, the sample consisted of 70 
enterprises and in non-EU countries, Switzerland and Norway, the sample size was 100. 
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private service industries3 with 20 or more employees were sampled. 5,238 
telephone interviews were completed between the 1st and 9th of April 2009. The 
sample is random, stratified by country, enterprise size (5 size bands) and industry 
(2-digit). A detailed description of the survey, sampling and data collection method 
can be found in European Commission (2009). 
The Innobarometer has been conducted on an annual basis since 2001. Each 
year the survey highlights a different issue/theme, which is reflected in additional 
questionnaire items. The focus of the 2009 survey was innovation related 
expenditures, and the effects of the economic downturn on such expenditures.  
The firms surveyed were asked a series of questions about changes in different 
aspects of investment in innovation over the period 2006-2008. As explained, the 
definition of innovation investment is quite broad. The questions addressed 
research and development (distinguishing between that performed in-house, and 
that acquired outside); acquisition of know-how; acquisition of machinery; design; 
collaboration with customers, with suppliers, with other companies in the same 
field, and with universities and research centres; innovation in marketing, and in 
organization; patents and design registration; knowledge management practices; 
open innovation practices; and whether innovation was driven by cost reduction, 
technological opportunities, or market opportunities. Following these came two 
summary questions. The first was: 
                                                 
3 Aerospace, defence, construction equipment, apparel, automotive, building fixtures, equipment, 
business services, chemical products, communications equipment, construction materials, 
distribution services, energy, entertainment, financial services, fishing products, footwear, furniture, 
heavy construction services, heavy machinery, hospitality and tourism, information technology, 
jewellery and precious metals, leather products, lighting and electrical equipment, lumber and wood 
manufacturers, medical devices, metal manufacturing, oil and gas products and services, paper, 
(bio)pharmaceuticals, plastics, power generation & transmission, processed food, publishing and 
printing, sport and child goods, textiles, transportation and logistics, utility. 
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Q3: “Compared to 2006, has the total amount spent on innovation in 2008, 
increased, decreased, or stayed the same?” 
Immediately following this, respondents were asked: 
Q4: “In the last six months has your company taken one of the following actions: 
increased total innovation expenditures, decreased […] or maintained […]?” 
Although “innovation investment” is not a category that many people would 
have clearly in mind most of the time, and is one of which we might ordinarily 
expect people to have widely varying interpretations, the fact that Q3 and Q4 come 
immediately after a series of more specific questions about the company’s 
innovation activities gives us some confidence that respondents would have had a 
common understanding of the term. 
The definition of innovation implicit in this series of questions is in line with the 
definition adopted in the Community Innovation Surveys and similar surveys 
elsewhere in the world. While there are obvious drawbacks to using a set of 
subjective self-assessments to measure innovation activity, this approach has the 
considerable advantage of getting a broad measure of innovation: certain aspects 
of innovation activity, such as formal R&D expenditures and patent applications, 
can be more precisely and objectively measured, but they capture a narrow and 
unrepresentative slice of overall innovation activity, and are heavily concentrated in 
a few industries and in larger firms, mostly in the manufacturing sector. With 
respect to the question addressed in this paper, R&D/patent measures alone are 
problematic because firms typically commit to such projects for extended periods, 
and the response over six months is likely to be slight. In contrast, items such as 
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training or design budgets, or new equipment purchases, can be – and often are – 
cut quickly. Moreover, the broader measure of innovation encompasses activities 
to which employees at all levels contribute, and are therefore more pertinent to 
our study.  
*************Table 1 about here********************* 
10% of firms said they had increased overall investment in the six months 
following the onset of the financial crisis, while 24% said they had reduced it and 
66% reported no change. 
The survey also provides data on changes in the firm’s turnover from 2006-8, 
number of employees, proportion of sales exported, and industry classification, 
among others (see Appendix Table 1). In our analysis, we use binary variables for 
decreased turnover (turn_fall) and firms with more than 250 domestic employees 
(LARGE). Pair-wise correlations of firm-level variables are reported in Table 2. 
*************Table 2 about here************************ 
To get a rough picture of how changes in innovation investment differ by 
country, we treat the responses as scales running from -1 (decreased spending) to 1 
(increased), take the mean by country, and plot them (Figure 1). Overall, the 
positive correlation arising between the innovation investment variables over the 
two periods the chart suggests the presence of resilience in innovation investment 
at the firm level, as found by Geroski and Walters (1995) and by Filippetti and 
Archibugi (2011). 
****************Figure 1 about here******************* 
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3.2 Country level variables 
At the country level, we have variables dealing with macroeconomic aggregates, 
labour market institutions and skills, and higher education. For the first, we use the 
percentage change in GDP from the first quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 
2008, and similarly for 2008 to 2009.  
Our measure of UI is the short-term earnings replacement rate (REPLACE), 
defined by the OECD as “net income replacement rates for unemployment benefits 
(percentage of earnings)” in the first year after job loss. The short term rate is the 
one relevant to both the EIS thesis and the flexicurity model, in that it facilitates re-
training. 
Our measure of JS is the OECD Employment Protection Index (PROTECT). This is a 
measure of the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of 
workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary 
work agency contracts. 
VET in our models is vocational and education training defined by the World 
Bank World Development Indicator as “Technical/vocational enrolment in ISCED 3 
as percentage of total enrolment in ISCED 3”.  
For comparison, we include a third group of variables addressing higher 
education – an area of education more usually included in innovation studies than 
VET is. These include science and engineering doctorates per capita (Eurostat), 
science and engineering degrees per capita (Eurostat), and the share of labour force 
with tertiary education (World Bank – World Development Indicators). 
***************Table 3 about here********************** 
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4. Analysis 
Our strategy for analyzing the data is to estimate an ordered logit model on the 
firm-level data and macro-economic variables, with country-level random effects. 
We then rank the country-level effects and compare them in tables with the tertile 
ranks of the country level variables. In principle, the random effects estimated in 
the first stage could be modelled as functions of the country-level variables – that 
is, an alternate strategy would have been to estimate a two-level model. We do not 
do this because, with only twenty-one countries, the statistical properties of the 
second stage estimates are not good. This is especially so given that there are 
plausible and important hypotheses which could only be tested using both levels 
and interactions of country-level variables. This difficulty is commonly encountered 
in doing statistical analysis of comparative international data, and in presents a 
choice between making heroic statistical assumptions (including the omission of 
variables of interest), and resorting to a low-tech tabular or visual presentation 
(Bowers and Drake 2005; Kedar and Shively 2005). We opt for the latter. 
Our regression model is: 
Innovation2008-9i,k = b1*Innovation2006-8i,k + b2*Large_Firmi,k + b3*Turnover_falli,k + 
b4*Export_Dependence i,k + b5*GDP0801k + b6*GDP0901k + industry controls + ek + u i,k (1) 
where ek is the country random effect. This is estimated in Stata using the GLLAMM 
package (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2004).  
Results of this estimation are reported in Table 4. The innovation trajectory in 
2006-2008 is a strong predictor of the innovation trajectory in the six months prior 
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to the survey. Reduced turnover during 2006-8 dampens innovation investment in 
2009; GDP growth in both 2007-8 and 2008-9 is, to our surprise, negatively 
associated with the change in innovation investment during the crisis, but the effect 
is not statistically significant; similarly, the circumstances to operate in international 
markets (INMKT) and firm size (LARGE) show little effect. 
******************Table 4 about here******************* 
The country effects from this regression, with their standard errors, are shown in 
Figure 2. The countries in which firms showed the strongest innovation 
performance during the crisis are all in north-western continental Europe, and are 
among what Hall and Soskice (2001) would classify as coordinated market 
economies: Switzerland tops the ranking, followed by Austria, Finland, Denmark, 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. There are, of course, significant differences 
among these countries’ economic institutions, but those seem small compared with 
the differences among the countries in the lower tail: starting at the bottom, we 
have Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Czech, the UK, Italy, and Slovakia. One might think 
that that what the countries performing worst have in common is a particularly bad 
experience with the financial crisis, but we have controlled for change in GDP. 
****************Figure 2 about here******************** 
Table 5 shows the country effects alongside each country’s ranking for 
unemployment replacement (REPLACE), VET enrolment (VET), and JS (EMPLOY). We 
have grouped these variables, so that that 1/3 of the countries with the lowest 
rankings for, e.g., REPLACE get a 1 in that column, those in the middle 1/3 get a 2, 
and those in the top 1/3 get a 3. 
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************Table 5 about here************************ 
Two things are striking about this table. One is that all of the countries in the top 
1/3 of the table – that is, those with relatively persistent firm-level innovation 
during the financial crisis - are in the top 2/3 in terms of both the earnings 
replacement rate and VET enrolment. In the bottom half of the table, many 
countries rank highly in either earnings replacement or VET enrolment, but only one 
(Czech) is strong in both of them; all other countries in the bottom half of the table 
are in the bottom 1/3 of either earnings replacement or VET – or in a few cases, 
both. One striking thing is the apparent diversity of the countries that performed 
badly: rich liberal market economies (the UK and Ireland), countries emerging from 
centrally planned economies in central and eastern Europe (all of those in the 
sample), and the poorer countries of the EU’s south (Greece and Portugal). What 
these countries have in common is that they lack – with the exception of the Czech 
Republic - the combination of high replacement rates and high VET participation. A 
good earnings replacement safety net together with a strong system of VET are, of 
course, key elements of flexicurity. 
The second striking thing about the table, however, is that while it shows clearly 
that the UI and training elements of flexicurity are, in combination, associated with 
a reduced likelihood of cutting expenditures on innovation, there is no clear 
relationship between JS and changes in innovation investment: the ‘flexi’ end of 
flexicurity appears to be irrelevant in this case. We see, in Table 5, the countries 
with the strongest JS grouped together in the middle of the pack, while countries at 
both the top and bottom are decidedly mixed in their levels of JS. For the present 
 21 
question, at least, the level of employment security (or its inverse, numerical 
flexibility for employers) does not appear to be very important. 
In Table 6, we present a similar breakdown for the three higher education 
variables. These are of interest both as additional measures of skill in a country’s 
workforce, and as indicators of the country’s science base. These are also, of 
course, the sort of education variables more commonly associated with innovation 
in the academic literature on the subject. The patterns here are not so clear cut. 
Science and engineering degrees (the middle column) bear no apparent relation to 
the country effect, but most of the countries which rank high in the persistence of 
innovation also rank high in science and engineering doctorates, and in tertiary 
education generally. 
************Table 6 about here************************ 
  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Firm-level investment in innovation in Europe during the onset of the financial 
crisis in 2008-9, held up best relative to pre-crisis investment in countries with both 
high UI and high participation in VET; these were also countries in which high 
numbers of people completed doctoral degrees in science and engineering 
subjects. We find no relationship, positive or negative, between the resilience of 
innovation investment and JS, nor with lower-level science and engineering 
degrees. These results must of course be treated with caution, both due to the 
short time frame covered by the data (six months into the crisis), and the small 
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number of independent units for country level data. They are, nonetheless, striking 
in several respects.  
One is the clear association between the persistence of innovation and the 
UI/VET combination. For reasons discussed above, it is not surprising that firms with 
skilled workforces would be more likely to maintain innovation during a downturn, 
than those without skilled workforces. But why should this not show up simply as a 
relationship between VET and innovation? If VET produces skill then, given a certain 
level of VET participation, why should UI matter? Similarly, there are plausible 
reasons why UI might affect innovation during a crisis, but why should this only be 
the case when VET participation is high? 
We believe that an explanation for the VET/UI pairing may lie in variations in 
what VET means in practice. The VET variable measures the proportion of a 
relevant age group undertaking vocational education and training at the secondary 
and post-secondary levels, but of course the content of this education and training 
can mean different things in different circumstances. As noted above, many critics 
regard VET as unresponsive to actual labour market needs. The tendency has been 
to attribute this problem to the difficulty public education systems have keeping up 
with changing workplace technologies; following EIS’s logic, we propose a different 
understanding of why VET programmes may fail, based on student motivation. 
Where UI is weak, students will devote their efforts to obtaining transferable skills 
(or, more cynically, transferable credentials). In EIS’s account, this should lead to a 
low rate of VET participation. Our results suggest a different possibility, which is 
that while poor social insurance may be associated with low VET participation, it 
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can sometimes instead produce ineffective VET. In the absence of adequate 
insurance students may want broadly transferable skills; they may want skills for 
relatively safe, stable occupations; they may want a relatively cheap and / or easy 
course which leads to a credential of some kind; but what they will surely not want 
is to make a substantial investment in specific, risky skills. If VET providers respond 
to student demand (or if students get out of VET what they are motivated to get), 
VET outcomes will be qualitatively different in settings with and without strong UI: 
only the latter will produce a strong supply of skills geared to bear the risk of rapidly 
changing technologies and markets. 
The apparent unimportance, in our results, of JS, poses a problem for the EIS 
analysis, and another much different problem for flexicurity policy. The problem for 
EIS is that the symmetry, in their story, between UI and JS, is not borne out in this 
case. The problem for flexicurity policy is that the flexibility element appears, at 
least in this case, to be irrelevant. As we noted above, the elimination of JS is, 
institutionally, the simplest element of flexicurity to implement: eliminating JS and 
failing to secure the other elements of flexicurity may accomplish exactly nothing, 
while establishing solid UI and VET may make reductions in JS superfluous. In 
theory, the irrelevance of JS after UI and VET are taken into account should not be 
surprising. JS should be a problem only when a lack of outside options keeps 
workers in bad job matches; where outside options are good enough – and the 
UI/VET combination can have a lot to do with whether they are good enough – the 
strength of JS becomes largely a question of whether workers or employers bear 
the costs of separations – that is, a distributional question rather than an 
allocational one (Fadda 2011). While we cannot come to a strong conclusion in this 
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respect on the basis of the narrow empirical results reported here, our finding is 
consistent with the existing literature in the area; further research on this question 
should be a priority. 
Finally, while it is not surprising to find - excepting the UK and Ireland – that 
countries with large numbers of science and engineering doctorates are relatively 
persistent in innovation, it is more surprising that this relationship is notably 
stronger than that for overall science and engineering degrees, or for tertiary 
education generally. In one sense this is parallel to the apparent importance of VET, 
since doctorates like VET tend to be more specific than first university degree; in 
another, taken with the VET, it suggests a synergy between production skills and 
research.  
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Tables for the text 
 
TABLE 1 
Direction of change in total innovation expenditure 
q3. compared to 2006, has the total amount spent on innovation in 2008 … 
increased 1,399 41.40% 
decreased 316 9.40% 
stayed the same 1,661 49.20% 
Total 3,376 100.00% 
   
q4. in the last six months has your company taken one of the following actions? 
increased total amount of innovation expenditures 349 10.30% 
decreased total amount of innovation expenditures 805 23.80% 
maintained total amount of innovation expenditures at the same level 2,222 65.80% 
Total 3,376 100.00% 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Correlation matrix for firm-level variables 
 
Innovation 
2008-9 
Innovation 
2006-8 LARGE turn_fall 
Innovation 2008-9 1    
Innovation 2006-8 0.245* 1   
LARGE -0.013 0.077* 1  
turn_fall -0.123* -0.215* -.0787* 1 
 
*: pair-wise correlation significant at .01 
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TABLE 3 
Country-level variables 
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G
D
P
0
9
0
1
 
Switzerland (ch) .97 .16 .77 .82 .66 .78 3 -2.2 
Austria (at) .72 .47 1.00 .56 .00 .18 3.4 -5.2 
Finland (fi) .90 .48 .58 .75 .41 1.00 2.6 -7.5 
Denmark (dk) .99 .30 .56 .22 .62 .82 -.2 -3.4 
Germany (de) .74 .55 .63 .49 .11 .47 2.1 -6.4 
Belgium (be) .74 .57 .60 .22 .28 .81 2.1 -4.1 
Netherland (nl) .97 .48 .82 .19 .36 .75 3.6 -4.5 
Luxemburg (lu) 1.00 1.00 .69 . . .57 3.4 -6 
Norway (no) .87 .78 .59 .22 .19 .91 .5 1.2 
France (fr) .72 .92 .38 .30 1.00 .58 1.7 -3.3 
Spain (es) .58 .89 .38 .11 .14 .68 1.9 -3.9 
Sweden (se) .82 .45 .67 .79 .20 .78 .9 -6.7 
Portugal (pt) .68 .96 .18 1.00 .22 .00 .9 -4.4 
Poland (pl) .59 .46 .43 .19 .77 .22 6.5 .9 
Slovakia (sk) .45 .28 .90 .20 .07 .04 9.7 -5.7 
Italy (it) .15 .46 .68 .20 .26 .00 .3 -6.4 
Un. Kingdom 
(uk) 
.64 .00 .00 .51 .75 .80 2 -4.9 
Czeck Rep. (cz) .75 .48 .94 .19 .10 .00 2.7 -4.4 
Ireland (ie) .84 .14 .17 .30 1.00 .82 -1.4 -9.3 
Hungary (hu) .72 .36 .06 .00 .21 .19 1.9 -6.7 
Greece (el) .00 .79 .16 .07 .09 .37 3.4 .3 
 
Note: except for the GDP variables, these have been standardized with a maximum of one and 
minimum of zero, representing respectively the highest and lowest levels in the sample. 
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TABLE 4 
Regression Output 
 
Dependent variable: inno2009  
  
inno2008 0.768*** 
 -0.063 
LARGE -0.157 
 -0.084 
INTMKT -0.042 
 -0.082 
gdp0901 -0.027 
 -0.029 
gdp0801 -0.027 
 -0.033 
turn_fall -0.422*** 
 -0.102 
industry dummies included 
_cut11  
Constant -1.160*** 
 -0.247 
_cut12  
Constant 2.412*** 
 -0.251 
coun1  
Constant 0.285*** 
 -0.062 
  
R-squared  
N 3237 
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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TABLE 5 
Country innovation effects and labour market institutions 
country 
country 
effect 
replacement 
rate 
VET 
employment 
protection 
ch 0.385 3 3 1 
at 0.297 2 3 2 
fi 0.251 3 2 2 
dk 0.237 3 2 1 
de 0.232 2 2 2 
be 0.210 2 2 3 
nl 0.191 3 3 2 
     
lu 0.106 3 3 3 
no 0.086 3 2 3 
fr 0.037 2 1 3 
es 0.032 1 1 3 
se 0.029 2 2 1 
pt -0.055 1 1 3 
pl -0.088 1 2 2 
     
sk -0.115 1 3 1 
it -0.177 1 3 2 
uk -0.202 1 1 1 
cz -0.242 2 3 2 
ie -0.302 3 1 1 
hu -0.389 2 1 1 
el -0.523 1 1 3 
 
Note: countries abbreviations as for Table 3 
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TABLE 6 
Country Innovation Effects and Tertiary Education 
 
country 
country 
effect 
S&E 
doctorate 
S&E 
graduates 
Tertiary 
education 
ch 0.39 3 3 2 
at 0.30 3 1 1 
fi 0.25 3 2 3 
dk 0.24 2 3 3 
de 0.23 2 1 2 
be 0.21 2 2 3 
nl 0.19 1 2 2 
     
lu 0.11 . . 2 
no 0.09 2 1 3 
fr 0.04 2 3 2 
es 0.03 1 1 2 
se 0.03 3 2 2 
pt -0.05 3 2 1 
pl -0.09 1 3 1 
     
sk -0.11 1 1 1 
it -0.18 1 2 1 
uk -0.2 3 3 3 
cz -0.24 1 1 1 
ie -0.30 2 3 3 
hu -0.39 1 2 1 
el -0.52 1 1 2 
 
 
Note: countries abbreviations as for Table 3 
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Figures for the text 
 
FIGURE 1 
Innovation investment prior the crisis and during the crisis 
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Note: countries abbreviations as for Table 3  
FIGURE 2 
Country Effects 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE 1A 
Domestic employment and turnover trend 
 No. % 
d2. how many employees does your company have [in your country]?  
20-49 1,330 39.40% 
50-249 1,075 31.80% 
250-499 634 18.80% 
500 or more 337 10.00% 
Total 3,376 100.00% 
   
d4. comparing your turnover of 2008 to that of 2006, did the annual turnover 
Decreased 561 16.60% 
Increased 2,032 60.20% 
approximately the same 692 20.50% 
dk/na 91 2.70% 
Total 3,376 100.00% 
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